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Unpacking patronage: The politics of patronage appointments in Argentina 
and Uruguay ’s central administrations. 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study makes the following contributions to the study of the politics of patronage 
appointments in Latin America:  Conceptually, it adopts  Kopecký et al (2008) 
distinction between clientelistic and non-clientelistic types of patronage politics as a 
conceptual lens for the study of patronage practices in Latin America’s presidentialist 
regimes..     Analytically, it sets up a new taxonomy of patronage appointments based 
on the roles appointees’ play vis a vis the Executive, the ruling party  and the public 
administration that can be used for the comparative study of the politics of patronage.  
Empirically, it applies the taxonomy to a pilot study of the politics of patronage in 
Argentina and Uruguay under two left of centre administrations. Theoretically, it 
contributes to theory building by relating the  findings of our research to differences in 
party systems and presidential powers in the countries under study and agency factors  
associated to the respective governments’ political projects. The article concludes that 
differences in patronage practices are a manifestation of two different forms of 
exercising governmental power:  a hyper-presidentialist, populist one in Argentina and 
a party-centered, social democratic one in Uruguay.  
 
KEYWORDS 
Patronage appointments, scope, power of appointment, motivations, roles. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the more important political factors affecting the quality of public institutions 
in Latin America is the colonization of the state by politically appointed public sector 
employees. In a classical study of the Latin American state published more than 40 
years ago, Douglas Chalmers  (1977, 24) argued that the enduring quality of Latin 
American politics in the 20th century was not a particular form of regime but the 
politicized quality of the state. He further argued that being “in power” was very 
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important because it gave leaders wide patronage and the authority to establish 
government programs to benefit existing supporters and attract new ones (31).   Much 
has changed in Latin America since Chalmers published his work but the argument 
about the politicized nature of the state has stood the test of time (Philip 2003; Spiller, 
Stein, Tommasi and Scartascini 2008).   
Scholars have  used the terms patronage and clientelism  interchangeably (Piattoni 
2001, 4)  to signify  the exchange  of public sector jobs for political support (Chubb 
1982, Geddes, 1994) This assimilation, however, has been challenged by analytical 
distinctions between clientelistic and non-clientelistic modalities of patronage 
(Kopecký et al. 2008; Piattoni 2001) and by awareness of the different roles appointees 
play in different political environments and even within the same public administration 
(Grindle 2012). And yet, there is surprisingly little comparative empirical research 
about the politics of patronage appointments in Latin America’s presidentialist central 
public administrations and about what explains differences between countries and 
within countries.   
This article contributes to the study of patronage appointments in Latin America’s 
presidentialist regimes by adopting and adapting  the definition of patronage 
appointments formulated by Kopecký, Scherlis and Spirova (2008) in order to set up a 
taxonomy of patronage appointments. It subsequently applies the taxonomy to the 
study of the politics of patronage appointments in Argentina and Uruguay’ central 
public administrations under two left –of- center governments and relate the findings 
to institutional and agency factors in the countries under study.   
We assume that the scope of patronage appointments, the power to make 
appointments, the motivations for the appointments and the roles played by 
appointees are the defining elements of the politics of patronage. We argue that 
differences in patronage practices in the two countries were shaped by institutional 
differences in presidential powers and party systems and by agency factors related to 
the political forces that controlled the government in the period under study.  We 
found that the scope of patronage largely confirms the picture of two politicized 
central administrations that were not, however, characterized by traditional forms of 
mass clientelism.  Within this common baseline,  politicisation not only run deeper in 
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Argentina but  also worked differently in the two countries.  In Argentina, patronage 
was centrally controlled by the presidency in strategic areas and by ministers in other 
areas. In contrast, in the case of Uruguay, patronage was largely devolved to the ruling 
party’s fractions with little central interference from the presidency. These findings, 
together with differences in the roles played by appointees present a clear picture 
about two different political systems, two different political projects and, ultimately 
two different modalities of exercising governmental power: A hyper-presidentialist, 
populist, politico-institutional regime in Argentina and a party-centered, social 
democratic one in Uruguay.    
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: The following section reviews the literature 
on patronage appointments. Section three defines the main concepts and sets up a 
taxonomy of patronage practices. The fourth section presents and justifies the choice 
of cases and theoretical assumptions. Section five outlines the research design and 
methodology. The sixth section presents the research’s main empirical findings. The 
concluding section discusses institutional and agency explanations for the differences 
in patronage practices between the two countries.  
 
 
2. THE POLITICS OF PATRONAGE APPOINTMENTS 
While there are a wealth of studies of clientelism in Latin America (see, among several 
others, Hilgers 2012; Lazar 2004; Levitsky 2003; Stokes et al 2013; Taylor 2004), as a 
general rule  these studies are mainly interested  in explaining variations in the scope 
of clientelism (Ames 1977; Geddes 1994; Gordin 2001; Hagopian, Gervasoni and 
Moraes 2009;)  and  in investigating  mechanisms  of clientelistic exchanges at 
subnational level (Oliveros 2016, Stokes 2005 ; Auyero 2000) with little attention  to 
mapping different  patronage practices in central administrations. 1  
Closer to our research interests are  Kopecký,  Scherlis and  Spirova (2008) work on 
conceptualizing and measuring patronage appointments; Kopecký, Mair and Spirova 
(2012) studies of the politics of patronage in European democracies; studies of political 
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appointments and coalition management at the upper levels of the Federal 
Government in Brazil (Bersch, Praça and Taylor 2017; Garcia Lopez 2015); Scherlis 
(2012) study of patronage practices in Argentina as a party building strategy  and  
Grindle’s (2012) comparative study of patronage and the politics of administrative 
reform. In common, these studies argue that patronage appointments are controlled 
and contested by different actors, that patrons have different motivations for making 
appointments, and that appointees perform a variety of roles within the public 
administration and have different levels of competence. 
In line with Kopecký, Scherlis and Spirova (2008), we define patronage appointments 
as the power of political actors to discretionally appoint individuals to (non-elective) 
positions in the public sector, irrespectively of the motivations for the appointment, 
the capabilities of the appointee and the legality of the decision.   As Kopecký et al 
(2016) note, this definition includes patronage appointments that are clientelistic in 
nature and others in which appointments are used for purposes others than 
clientelistic exchanges. In consequence, we distinguish between different types of 
patronage roles (see below) and define clientelistic appointments -the exchange of 
public sector jobs for votes- (Lémarchand 1981; Roniger 1994) as one among different 
varieties of patronage appointments. 
Two clarifications are necessary to better understand the relations between 
clientelism and patronage: 1) Recruitment to patronage positions defines obligations 
but not necessarily motivations and roles, as those who are politically appointed to 
positions in the public sector may be in such positions for a variety of reasons other 
than furthering the patron’s electoral chances (Grindle 2012; Johnston 1979; Key 1964; 
Kopecký et al. 2012; Müller 2006).  While sharing with clientelism the politicized and 
discretional nature of the appointment, patronage appointments include 
appointments where professional qualifications –rather than just partisan criteria- may 
have been taken into account (Grindle 2012).  
2) Trust is of the essence of patronage. It cuts across the other selection criteria and 
combines with them in different measures.  It can be personal to the politician or 
political to the party. Even in the cases in which patronage appointments are made in 
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accordance with the law, there is always an asymmetry of power between the patron 
and the appointee, as appointees serve at the discretion of the patron, making the 
position dependent on relations of personal trust or partisan loyalty between the 
politician and the appointee (Grindle 2012: 19) . 
 
3. MAPPING PATRONAGE PRACTICES  
In order to map patronage practices in Argentina and Uruguay we look at three 
elements regarded by the comparative literature as crucial for the study of the politics 
of patronage: The scope of appointments; who has the power to appoint and the 
patron’s motivation for the appointments.  We  use the motivations for appointments 
as a lens to identify the roles played by appointees and construct a taxonomy of 
patronage appointments. 
By scope we mean the range of state agencies that include patronage appointments 
(breadth) and the levels (depth) that patronage appointments reach within the 
administrative hierarchy of a given state agency.  By measuring scope we aim at 
determining levels of politicization within countries and between countries (Kopecký et 
al 2016).  
By power of appointment we understand the political actor or actors that have the real 
power of appointment regardless of the legal one. By studying the power of 
appointment we aim at determining  the partisan or personalistic nature of patronage 
networks and the ability of Executive office holders to make patronage appointments 
with autonomy from the ruling  party or parties (Scherlis 2012).  
By motivations we understand the reason or reasons patrons have when making an 
appointment (patrons may have more than one reason when making an appointment). 
Motivations largely determine the roles played by appointees (Connaughton 2015; 
Grindle 2012) and define the appointees’ relations vis a vis  the Executive, political 
system and the public administration.  Studies of patronage in Europe show that 
parties have sought to compensate their lack of an active militancy by becoming 
increasingly embedded in the state apparatus (Katz and Mair 1995).  Following this 
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logic, appointments are used to reward and maintain a network of political activists. 
While this may be the case, there is still the need to find out what roles –both political 
and technical- are played by appointees  once appointed. In line with this objective and 
in order to better capture the roles appointees play vis a vis the Executive, political 
parties and the public administration we analytically distinguish the following four 
motivations for the appointments:  
1) The provision of technical advice and expertise. While a neutral and technically 
qualified civil service is regarded as an important asset for the practice of good 
governance, politicians increasingly seek the advice of experts aligned with their 
political views for policy design and implementation (Aberbach and Rockman 2005). 
We call this category ‘counsellors’. The category includes experts that are organically 
linked to the ruling party and combine both party political loyalty and technical 
capabilities (what the literature calls technopols (Domínguez 2010; Joignant 2011)) and 
more independent experts aligned with the policies rather than the politics of the 
government (what the literature calls technocrats (Dargent 2014)). Counsellors are 
typically found at the higher level of the administrative hierarchy.   
2) The control of the public bureaucracy and other public sector resources (Kopecký et 
al 2012) by acting as the “eyes, ears and mouth” of their patrons (Connaughton 2015). 
We call this category ‘commissars’. Appointees in this category are appointed to 
supervise and control the public bureaucracy on behalf of the ruling party, party 
fraction or individual office holders. In the later case, they tend to follow their political 
patrons through their different postings, as exemplified by the “equipos” attached to 
individual politicians in Mexico. In a different guise, they are also common in the US 
federal administration 2.  
3) Securing political support for policy initiatives.  This category of appointments is 
related  to the political rather than the technical dimension of the policy-making 
process.  In order to secure political support for public policy initiatives governments 
need skilled political negotiators to liaise with Congress and other key stakeholders. 
Appointees often play this role. We call these appointees ‘political operators’. 
Operators are particularly required  in presidential systems in which the president has 
moderate powers and is obliged to permanently negotiate political support with other 
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political actors, as is the case in the USA (Halligan 2003).  They tend to be party 
political cadres and to be found at the upper and medium levels of the public 
administration.  
4) To gather  electoral support. This task is typically carried out by low level public 
sector employees acting as brokers (‘punteros’, ‘cabos electorais’, ‘caudillos de barrio’, 
‘ward bosses’) and activists.   Brokers mediate particularistic exchanges between the 
government and the recipients of public goods and services on behalf of the ruling 
party or individual politicians (Stokes et al. 2013).  Activists, in turn, participate as 
political cliques in political rallies and distribute electoral propaganda on behalf of the 
ruling party or their political patrons.  They are typical of political systems that 
resource to mass clientelism as an electoral currency, particularly at provincial and 
municipal level.   
 
Table one below presents our taxonomy of patronage appointments. 
Table 1 about here 
We conceive our taxonomy as a tool that can be used to better understand differences 
in patronage practices. The prevalence of certain types of appointments and the 
nature of patronage networks within a given administration is set to impact 
differentially on governance and governability and give insights about the relations 
between party systems, executive office holders and the public administration.  
In the case studies below, we apply our taxonomy to the study of the politics of 
patronage practices in the central public administrations of Argentina and Uruguay 
under the left-of-center governments  of Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner in Argentina (2003-2007; 2007- 2015) and Tabaré Vazquez (2005-2010) and 
José Mujica (2010-2015) in Uruguay. 
 
4. CASE STUDIES: ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY 
8 
 
The cases of Argentina and Uruguay are particularly well-suited for a pilot study of the 
politics of patronage appointments in Latin America under John Stuart Mill’s method 
of difference (Lijphart 1977; Mill 1961). The cases combine strong contextual 
similarities in the socio-economic and historical variables with important differences in 
the institutional and agency factors that are assumed to explain variation in the politics 
of patronage. 
The combination of similarities and differences is bound to minimize variance in 
certain variables while making it more evident in others. Argentina and Uruguay have 
similar and relatively high levels of economic and human development (United Nations 
Development Program 2016; World Bank 2016), which has been regarded as an 
important variable in explaining the decline in the use of mass clientelism as an 
electoral resource (Kopecký and Mair 2006; Stokes et al. 2013). Both countries share 
strong historical, economic and cultural links and have experienced similar cycles of 
authoritarianism and democratization since the 1970s. The two countries were the 
earliest full democracies in Latin America (González 2012). Concerning the history of 
the public sector, in both countries democratization preceded the setting up of a 
professional bureaucracy, a sequence that has been associated to the politicization of 
the civil service (Shefter 1977). The two countries shared the same score (52 in a 1 to 
100 scale) in  Zuvanic,  Iacoviello and  Rodríguez Gustá (2010) index of the use of merit 
in bureaucratic bodies. The score places them equal fourth in the region behind Brazil, 
Chile and Costa Rica and well above the Latin American average of 33 in the ranking of 
public sector professionalization. These conditions make the central public 
administrations of these two relatively highly-developed countries an ideal locus for 
our research because we expect to find politicized but not mass clientelistic central 
administration bureaucracies3. 
In contrast, the two countries exhibit significant variation in key institutional and 
agency factors that have been related to the politics of patronage.  Institutionally, 
Argentina has been characterized as a “delegative democracy” and as a hyper-
presentialist democracy (Castells 2012; Casullo 2015; Nino 1992; O’Donnell 1994; 
Rose-Ackerman and Desierto 2011). The characterization refers to the combination of 
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majoritarian politics, weak horizontal accountability and the political centrality of the 
presidency.  The Argentinean president enjoys strong legislative powers that allow the 
president to rule by decree, have budgetary initiative and use legislative line item veto 
(Cox and Morgenstern 2001; Payne 2006; Negretto 2004). Concerning the party 
system, from the second half of the twentieth century until the November 2015 
presidential election, it was dominated by the Peronist Party. The 2001-02 financial 
crises hit particularly hard the non-Peronist parties in office at the time, reinforcing the 
historical hegemony of the Peronist Party that won three consecutive presidential 
elections between 2003 and 2011 (Casullo 2015; Torre 2003).  
Institutionally, Uruguay is a liberal democracy (Freedom House 2017) characterized by 
a strong rule of law and an effective system of checks and balances (World Bank 2016). 
The political system is  characterized by a highly institutionalized party system with 
strong programmatic elements (Kitschelt et al. 2010; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). 
Parties are internally organized in political fractions that are also highly 
institutionalized. Presidential powers in Uruguay are relatively weaker than in 
Argentina (Payne 2006)4. Politically, the power of the president is constrained by the 
need to negotiate with the ruling party and party fractions and by a more powerful 
parliament. This makes Uruguay one of the few countries in the region that can be 
typified as a system of party government (Katz 1986; Rose 1969; Wildenmann 1986).  
Politically, Argentina has a long-tradition of populism, to the extent that it has been 
labeled a populist democracy (Casullo 2015). The Peronist Party has been historically 
regarded as one of the electorally most successful populist machines in the region 
(Levitsky and Roberts 2011).  Presidents belonging to the Peronist Party  have 
traditionally enjoyed a high degree of discretion to allocate state resources that they 
use to consolidate their power over the ruling party and, via the state governors, over 
the clientelistic provincial political machines that provide crucial electoral support 
(Scherlis 2013).  
 
The Peronist Party administrations of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina 
Fernández de Kirchner (2007– 2011 and 2011-2015) were regarded as examples of the 
national popular, left-populist governments in Latin America’s populist- social 
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democratic Left divide (González 2012; Horowitz 2012; Philip and Panizza 2011). The 
Kirchners’ own political grouping, the Frente para la Victoria (FPV, the Front for 
Victory, also known as “Kirchnerismo”), was formally part of the Peronist Party but 
relations between the two organizations were often strained, as  the grouping  became 
effectively an autonomous political machine controlled by the Kirchners from the 
Executive.  
The Frente Amplio administrations that ruled Uruguay between 2005 and 2015 were 
regarded as part of Latin America’s  21st century’s “late social democracies” (Lanzaro 
2014).  The Frente Amplio is an alliance of left and left- of- center political groupings 
that in line with the institutional features of Uruguay’s political parties are formally 
constituted as autonomous political fractions. The Frente Amplio’s access to 
government in 2005 represented an important change in Uruguay’s historical 
domination by the traditional Colorado and Blanco parties without, however, 
representing a rupture with the country’s liberal democratic institutions, strong 
welfare state, mixed economy, policy gradualism and highly institutionalized party 
system (Lanzaro 2014; Panizza 2015).  
 
The large number of institutional and agency variables that are  considered to 
influence patronage appointments makes difficult to account for differences in 
practices at high levels of generality independently of the political context. Aware of 
the danger of generalizing from a paired comparison, this study assumes that 
differences in the politics of patronage in the two countries are the result of a number 
of politico-institutional and agency factors that find expression in two different forms 
of exercising governmental power. We expect that in the period under study in 
Argentina, stronger presidential powers, a dominant party, a weaker party system and 
high levels of political polarization will result in higher levels of politicization of the 
public administration; that presidents and ministers will exercise their power of 
appointment with relatively high degrees of autonomy from the ruling party and that 
control of the public administration and the electorally- driven intermediation 
between the government and the recipients of public goods and services will be a 
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significant motivation for the appointments. In Uruguay, we expect that a competitive 
party system, the consociational nature (Lijhpart 1977) of the decision- making process 
and lower levels of political polarization will result in a lower scope of patronage, that 
parties will have significant  influence in the process of appointments, that securing 
political support for the government  will be a significant motivation for the 
appointment and that the programmatic nature of the party system will be reflected in 
the importance of technical advice and expertise. In terms of our taxonomy, we expect 
to find relatively more commissars  brokers and activists in Argentina and more 
counsellors and political operators in Uruguay. 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
Measuring patronage is no straightforward, as the exercise of patronage comprises a 
combination of formal and informal practices (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). An analysis 
of formal rules, such as laws, decrees and constitutional dispositions that regulate 
public sector appointments can give a broad idea of the official number of discretional 
appointments. Such a study, however, risks missing a significant number of   
appointments that are regulated by informal rules that sidestep, bypass, distort or 
simply violate legal dispositions. As Grindle (2012, 145-46) put it, as is often the case 
‘de facto practice trump de jure theory’. In an attempt to have a more comprehensive  
picture, scholars have attempted  to estimate the numbers of discretional 
appointments by using proxies, such as increases in the number of public employees or 
in personnel spending. These indicators, however, are influenced by factors beyond 
the power of actors to appoint discretionarily and may thus not truly reflect patronage 
practices (Kopecký et al. 2012; Scherlis 2013). 
Informal practices are notoriously difficult to measure with accuracy and borderline 
cases often require judgment calls. An accepted qualitative method for measuring the 
impact of informal institutions on public life is to survey the perceptions of experts 
(Peabody et al. 1990; Transparency International 2017).  For example, the method was  
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used by Peter Evans and James Rauch (1999) to identify features of Weberian 
bureaucracies in newly industrialized countries.  
Our research adopts and adapts the method of experts’ survey originally developed by 
Kopecký et al. (2008) and more recently employed by Meyer-Sahling and  Veem (2012) 
and by Kopecký et al (2016) for the comparative study of patronage in 22 countries 
from five world regions. In order to have a more rounded picture of the two countries’ 
patronage practices and in an attempt to minimize cognitive and political bias we drew 
our interviewees from a wide range of political and professional fields comprising 
experts with a broad  knowledge of the public administration and party systems of the 
countries in question and key informants chosen for their inside knowledge of the four 
areas of the central public administration of each country selected for this research. 
Experts included scholars, specialized journalists, trades union leaders , 
parliamentarians, and public sector consultants. Key informants, included active and 
retired career civil servants, trade unionists, current and former Executive office 
holders  and politically-appointed public sector workers.   
We choose four policy areas representative of the central public administration in both 
countries: the economy, social development, foreign relations and agriculture. These 
areas were chosen on the expectation based on the literature on public bureaucracies 
that they represent different patterns of bureaucratic professionalization (Peters 
1988): More professional in the economy and foreign affairs, more technical in 
agriculture and more politicized in social development. The administrative hierarchy in 
each area was divided into “High” (top managerial level), “Medium” (lower managerial 
and high administrative levels) and “Low” (low administrative level, technical and 
service personnel) tiers, in accordance with each country’s administrative scale of 
public sector positions.  
The questionnaire was administered through semi-structured, face-to-face interviews 
with 16 experts (9 in Argentina and 7 in Uruguay), and 64 key informants (29 in 
Argentina and 35 in Uruguay) conducted between [month/year] and [month/year]. 
The questionnaire and list of interviewees with their work profiles are attached as an 
appendix.  Interviewees were asked to provide quantitative estimates and qualitative 
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accounts of patronage. As a way of estimating the scope of patronage appointments 
taking into account both formal and informal rules we used the so-called Index of Party 
Patronage (IPP) (Kopecký et al. 2008, 2012, 2016). The method uses  survey results to 
measure the extension and depth of patronage appointments across institutions and 
levels of hierarchy. The IPP varies from zero (no patronage appointments) to one (all 
appointments are patronage appointments).  
We complemented the questionnaire and checked the interviewees’ views against a 
number of primary and secondary sources. These included government documents, 
background interviews, freedom of information requests, press reports, international 
surveys and academic studies. For changes in the total number of public employees we 
relied on officially published figures. We surveyed legislation and other publically 
available sources to estimate the number of discretional appointments authorized by 
law. The following section presents a summary of our main findings. 
 
 
5. FINDINGS 
5.1 Scope and politicization 
According to our survey, at 0.77, the IPP of Argentina was significantly higher   than 
that of Uruguay (0.61). To place the figures into context, the IPPs of both Argentina 
and Uruguay were above those of Eastern Europe (0.42) and Southern Europe (0.45) 
but well below those of Guatemala (0.98) and Paraguay (0.97), two Latin American 
countries characterized by mass patronage (Kopecký et al 2016).    
To complement the IPP, we looked at the ratio of non-tenured (mainly public sector 
workers on fix-term contracts) to tenured positions.  While this indicator must be used 
with caution because non-tenured employees can be appointed for a variety of 
reasons and many contracts tend to be eventually converted into tenured positions 
(Scherlis 2013), a large number of non-tenured public workers on fix-term contracts 
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may be a mechanism for setting up a parallel administration and thus a proxy for 
politicization.  In Argentina under the Kirchners, there was a sharp increase in the ratio 
of non-tenured to tenured appointments, which went from 20.3% to 57.3% (Llano and 
Iacoviello 2015). In contrast, in Uruguay, there was a small decline from 8.8% to 6.2% 
in the same ratio during the administrations of the Frente Amplio (Observatorio 2016). 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Patronage appointments reached considerable depths within the administrative 
structure, particularly in Argentina 5.  In this country, 89% of interviewees considered 
that most appointments (ranging between 80% and 100%) at the top level of the 
administrative structure (the one immediately below political positions, such as 
ministers) were based on patronage , whilst in Uruguay 88% of    interviewees   also 
choose this range 
The finding was not particularly surprising in the case of Uruguay, given that the law 
establishes the discretionary nature of appointments at this level. In Argentina, 
however, positions at this level are mandated by law to be filled through competitive 
processes (“concursos de oposicion y méritos”) among high civil servants and the 
winners should be appointed for a period of between five to seven years.  
According to the survey results, a significant proportion of mid-level appointments in 
both countries were also based on patronage. Range estimates, however, varied 
significantly both within and between countries. In Argentina, 35.7 % of respondents 
estimated that between 50% and 79% of appointments at this level were patronage 
appointments, while a further 32% estimated the appointments at the lower range  of 
between 10% to 49% . In Uruguay, 39.5 % and 18.6% of interviewees opted for the 
higher and lower ratios respectively. Altogether, 67.7% of interviewees in Argentina 
and 58.1% of those in Uruguay considered that there were at least some patronage 
appointments at the medium level of the administrative hierarchy. This finding goes 
against legal dispositions in both countries prescribing that most if not all positions at 
this level must be filled by career civil servants in accordance to rules for promotions.   
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A difference between the two countries was that while in Uruguay appointees at this 
level were usually co-opted from within the ministry or agency   and appointed to a 
higher managerial position on a temporary basis, in Argentina they tended to be 
outsiders to the ministry or agency, thus further disrupting the agency’s administrative 
structure.6  
 
The survey also showed differences between Argentina and Uruguay in the scope of 
patronage appointments at the lowest levels of the public administration. The central 
public administration in Uruguay was perceived as  nearly free of patronage 
appointments by a large majority of interviewees (97.8%). In contrast, all   
Interviewees in Argentina  claimed that there were at least  some patronage 
appointments at this level, although they differed  on estimates of its magnitude.   
Differences within countries in estimates of patronage at both medium and lower 
levels  are at least partly explained because of variations in scope between the areas of 
the public administration covered in the survey. For example, both in Argentina and 
Uruguay key informants in the ministry of Social Development coincided that most 
appointments at medium level were patronage appointments while informants from 
the ministry of Foreign Relations perceived lower levels of patronage at the same level.  
 
    Table 2 about here 
 All interviewees in Uruguay agreed that political and policy differences between the 
Frente Amplio administrations and previous governments did not lead to a significant 
overall increase in patronage appointments or to different patterns of politicization. It 
must be noted, however, that the number of legally authorized discretional 
appointments (“cargos de confianza”) at both national and departmental (provincial) 
level went up from 324 in 2005 (Ramos Larraburu, 2009, 354; Correa Freitas and 
Vázquez 1998, 159) to 671 in 2015 (Oficina Nacional de Servicio Civil, Observatorio de 
la Gestión Humana del Estado, 2016 29, Table 11).7 While the increase is apparently 
significant, only 159 of the positions were in the central administration with the 
majority (440) of the cargos de confianza being appointments at the departmental 
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(provincial) level. Moreover, these positions amount to just about 0.2% of the total 
number of public employees. Regarding non-discretional appointments, the 
administration of President Mujica centralized civil service recruitment in the National 
Civil Service Bureau (Oficina Nacional de Servicio Civil, ONSC) to increase compliance 
with meritocratic processes8. 
 
5.2 Who appoints? 
The degree of consultation between the president, ministers and parties when making 
patronage appointments is an important indicator of the powers of the president and 
of the relations between the ruling party or parties and Executive office holders. Our 
research shows that while in some cases officeholders (presidents and ministers) 
exercised their powers of appointment autonomously, in others they did it in 
consultation with other relevant actors. Figure 2 summarizes the aggregate results of 
the respondents’ perceptions on the powers of appointment in Argentina and Uruguay 
Figure 2 about here  
 
Two main findings stand out from this section of the research:  
1) Presidents and ministers played a key role in the appointment process in both 
countries. The  majority of our informants (48.5% in Argentina and 74% in Uruguay) 
agreed that ministers were the most relevant patrons within the ministries under their 
control but a significantly larger number  of informants in Argentina (45%) than in 
Uruguay (12%) considered that it was the president who held the main power of 
appointment. 9 The claim that ministers had power of appointment  did not mean, 
however, that they personally made discretional appointments in all areas and at all 
levels within their domains.  Ministers often delegated powers of appointments down 
the administrative ladder to under-secretaries, agency directors and program 
coordinators, whom in many cases were political appointees themselves. 
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2) In Argentina, over 70% of respondents claimed that presidents and ministers made 
appointments with autonomy from the ruling party. Presidents Néstor Kirchner and 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner largely ignored the ruling Peronist Party when making 
appointments, relying instead mostly on trusted former members of Néstor Kirchner’s 
state administration of the province of Santa Cruz (1991-2002) (Scherlis 2012) and 
used patronage appointments to build up their own political grouping, the Frente Para 
la Victoria, from within the state.  
 During the administrations of Presidents Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner, there was an intensive process of top-down politicization (Van der Meer et 
al. 2007) intended to secure the Presidency’s political control of the public 
administration, particularly over strategic agencies. As noted by several key 
informants,  this process was particularly noticeable during the last two years of 
President Fernández de Kirchner’s second administration. To this purpose, the 
Executive colonized key public sector agencies by making patronage appointments at 
levels traditionally staffed by professional bureaucrats.10  For instance, in 2006, in a 
highly publicized and well-documented case (Jueguen and Bullrich 2009; Noriega 
2012), the government of President Néstor Kirchner removed over 20 professional 
staff from the National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censo, 
INDEC) and replaced them with political appointees in order to manipulate official 
figures for inflation.  
The distinction between the personal and the partisan and between public sector 
duties and political activism was, however, not always clear-cut in Argentina. For 
example, the appointment of militants of La Cámpora (a political grouping directly 
controlled by the Kirchners) was based on personal links that often went back to a 
common university background but in many cases appointer and appointee also 
shared politico-ideological sympathies. Moreover, La Cámpora itself evolved from 
being a loose network of militants into a more institutionalized political grouping, 
further blurring the distinction between personal and partisan loyalty.  The grouping 
was originally set up by Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s son, 
Máximo, in 2003 as an organization of young political cadres at the service of his 
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parents’ political project (Rocca Rivarola 2013). Particularly in the last two years of her 
second mandate (2011-2015), President Fernández de Kirchner used her powers of 
appointment to build up La Cámpora as a personal political machine (Novaro, 
Bonvecchi and Cherny (2015).   Close political allies of the president followed the same 
logic. For example, Alicia Kirchner, sister of the late Néstor Kirchner and  Minister for 
Social Development during both Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s 
administrations, set up  the so-called Kolina organization of activists within the 
ministry as a personal political apparatus that came to be known as “La Agrupación de 
Alicia” (“Alicia’s Grouping”) (Vázquez 2014: 86).     
In contrast to the FPV’s state-centered construction of its political organization, in 
Uruguay party fractions were structured outside and independently of the public 
administration. However, party fractions were still key actors in the politics of 
patronage.  As a general rule, presidents from all parties took into account the political 
weight of the ruling parties’ highly institutionalized party fractions when making 
ministerial appointments or, in the case of coalition governments, of the  parties and 
factions of the governmental coalition (Buquet, Chasquetti and Cardarello 2013: 17). 
According to our survey, ministers enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from the 
president when making appointments within their ministries but in most cases they  
consulted their party or party fraction and appointed members of their own political 
fractions.  A study of discretional appointments below cabinet level during the 2005-
2015 Frente Amplio administrations by Ramos, Casa and Samudio (unpublished) shows 
a high positive correlation between the relative electoral weight of   the party’s 
fractions and the number of discretional appointments made by each fraction, 
suggesting that discretional appointments were part of the government’s coalition 
management toolkit.    
  
5.3 Motivations and roles 
Addressing the patrons’ motivations for making appointments is crucial for 
understanding the roles played by political appointees.  Table 3 summarizes the 
interviewees’ perceptions about the patrons’ main motivations and of the roles 
19 
 
performed by the appointees.  In analyzing the results it must be taken into account 
that patrons could have more than one motivation when making an appointment. 
Table 3 about here 
According to 87% of interviewees in Argentina and 75% of those in Uruguay the main 
motivation for appointments at the top and medium tiers of the public administration  
was the  provision technical advice and expertise for policy design and implementation  
that lead to the appointment of counsellors. Technical expertise, however, was not the 
sole criteria for these appointments, as it was always combined with either personal or 
partisan trust. While in Uruguay there was a strong emphasis on partisan trust, in 
Argentina there were no significant differences between personal and partisan trust, 
which is in line with the observation from interviewees that technical, personal and 
partisan links were often superimposed in groupings such as La Cámpora. 11   
 
A further significant difference in motivations is apparent from comparing the relative 
importance assigned to control over the bureaucracy and to the ability to operate 
politically. According to the survey figures, across all levels of the two countries’ 
central public administration there was more than 10 percentage points difference in 
favour of Argentina in the importance assigned to control over the bureaucracy that 
was reflected in the appointment of a higher number of commissars. Some 
interviewees noted that the Kirchners’ administrations were particularly mistrustful of 
the loyalty and neutrality of the civil service. One key informer, a politically-appointed 
high civil servant in the Ministry of Finance, who belongs to the Cuerpo de 
Administradores Gubernamentales (a  senior public sector managers body of public 
employees), encapsulated the government’s skepticism about the principle of 
politically-neutral civil service by arguing that it would be impossible to implement 
government policies by trusting civil servants from previous administrations because of 
their different views about the working of the economy.12  The informant’s  remark 
must be interpreted within the context of a government that sought to break with the 
neoliberal consensus that had dominated Argentinean politics over the past two 
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decades (Wylde 2016). Rightly or wrongly, office-holding politicians saw career civil 
servants as part of the old consensus which could only be broken by the appointment 
of trusted commissars to control the public bureaucracy. 
Table 4 about here 
 
 
Moreover, technical expertise and political activism were not regarded as separate 
qualities; rather, they complemented each other in the technical and political pursuit 
of an alternative model of development and the consolidation of the political 
hegemony of the Frente Por la Victoria.  As one of our interviewees, an agronomist 
working in the Ministry of Agroindustry, put it: “People think that because we are 
militants of La Cámpora we are here to bang the drums [a practice associated with 
Peronista party and unions political rallies] and eat choripans [bbq pork sausages, a 
street food associated with popular culture] but in fact many of us belong to the 
intellectual middle class”.13 In an example of the blurring of the distinction between 
technical expertise and political militancy, in 2011 a group of economists within the 
Ministry of the Economy created an organization called La GraN Makro, with the 
purpose of publicly defending the government’s economic policies as a technically 
sound alternative to neoliberal orthodoxy (Vázquez 2014: 73).   
In contrast, in Uruguay, the more gradualist nature of political and economic change 
and the consociational characteristics of its political system resulted in the highest 
priority assigned to the appointment of political operators in order to articulate  
political support for the government’s policies within the ruling party and party 
fractions:  69%  of our interviewees in Uruguay considered the ability to operate 
politically as relevant selection criteria at the top level of the public administration and 
a further  43%  regarded it as relevant at the medium level. The corresponding figures 
for Argentina were 42.9%  and 10.7%  respectively.  
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Furthermore, it is important to notice that in Uruguay counsellors often doubled as 
political operators, as many counsellors were also party members with considerable 
political experience and used their political knowhow to gain support for government 
policies. One of our key informants, , a high ranking policy maker in the ministry of the 
Economy during the first Vázquez administration, highlighted his role as political 
operator, noting that he used to spend about half of his time negotiating political 
support for the ministry’s policies with leaders of his own party within the Executive, 
Parliament and the Frente Amplio’s executive14. 
In the lower tier of the public administration the appointment of brokers to mediate 
between the government and the recipients of public goods and services was 
perceived by 64% of interviewees that detected patronage at this level in Argentina  as 
the top motivation for the appointments. Other studies have shown that the wider 
category of political activists was also relevant at this level (Zarazaga 2014, Faur 2011). 
15  The importance of political activism  at this level is reflected in the comment from 
one of our key informants,, an employee in the ministry of Agroindustry:  “ I recently 
joined the ministry together with a large group of Peronist militants to work in the 
administration while simultaneously campaigning for the government. Recently, my 
comrades called me to attention because lately I have become too involved with my 
work within the ministry to the neglect of  political militancy.”16  
In Uruguay, the low numbers of discretional appointments at this level do not allow to 
draw any firm conclusions about motivations 
 
 
 
 
6. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our comparative study bridges the literature on public administration and on politics, 
two strands of scholarly research that not always talk to each other. It makes four 
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contributions to the study of the politics of patronage in Latin America:  Conceptually, 
it adopts Kopecký et al distinction between clientelistic and other modalities of 
patronage appointments and broadens the authors’ classification of the patrons 
motivations for making appointments to better reflect the variety of roles played by 
appointees vis a vis the Executive, the ruling party and the public administration .   
Analytically, it sets up a new taxonomy of patronage appointments that can be used 
for the comparative study of the politics of patronage.  Empirically, it applied the 
taxonomy to a pilot study of the politics of patronage in Argentina and Uruguay under 
two left of centre administrations. Theoretically, with the customary caveats about 
generalizing from a paired comparison, contributes to theory building  on the politics 
of patronage in Latin America by relating differences in patronage practices to 
institutional and political factors in the countries under study.  
Five main findings emerge from our study: 
1) The scope of patronage largely confirms the picture of two politicized central 
administrations that were not, however, characterized by traditional forms of mass 
clientelism. Within this common baseline, differences in the IPP and in the ratio of 
non- tenured to tenured public sector workers  are evidence that the central public 
administration in Argentina was more politicized than in Uruguay.   
2) Politicisation not only run deeper in Argentina but it also worked different in the 
two countries.  In Argentina, patronage was centrally controlled by the presidency in 
strategic areas and by ministers in other areas. As a general rule, there was little 
consultation with the Peronist Party when making appointments.    
Particularly during the administration of President Fernández de Kirchner, patronage 
appointments were used to build up La Cámpora as a personal political machine at her 
own service, autonomous from the Peronist Party and even the Frente Parala Victoria.  
Through the appointment of La Cámpora cadres in different areas of the public 
administration, President Fernández de Kirchner reinforced her control over a public 
sector bureaucracy that was deeply mistrusted to implement the foundational project 
of her government. Last but not least, there was significant blurring of the divide 
between public sector service and political activism.  
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 In contrast, in the case of Uruguay, patronage was largely devolved to the Frente 
Amplio’s fractions with little central interference from the presidency.  As a general 
rule, ministers appointed persons that enjoyed their personal trust but in consultation 
with their own fraction. The more horizontal nature of patronage appointments in 
Uruguay suggests that appointments were used as tools of coalition management by 
the presidency and as mechanisms to consolidate the influence of their fractions by 
ministers.  
3) An analysis of the motivations for the appointment in terms of our taxonomy shows 
that contrary to our expectations there were no significant differences between the 
two countries in the importance assigned to the appointment of counsellors.  This was 
an unexpected finding concerning Argentina, given the emphasis in the literature on 
the Peronist Party’s lack of firm ideological foundations and the importance assigned 
by the party to corporatism and clientelism as an electoral mechanism. The finding, 
however, is in line with arguments that programmatic and clientelistic electoral 
appeals can coexist in a political system, often operating at different territorial and 
political levels (Luna 2014). The importance of counsellors in Argentina can also be 
explained by the Kirchners’ determination to make a clear break with the neoliberal 
policies of the previous administrations (Wylde 2016) and their lack of trust in the 
neutrality of a public administration they suspected to too close politically and 
ideologically to previous governments.  
In contrast, and in line with our expectations, we found that relatively more 
commissars were appointed in Argentina and more political operators in Uruguay.  If 
we take this finding together with the findings about differences in scope and in the 
real powers of appointment, a clear picture emerges about two different political 
systems, two different political projects and, ultimately two different modalities of 
exercising governmental power.   
Institutionally, differences in patronage practices can be attributes to Argentina being 
a political system with a strong presidency and a weakly institutionalized party system 
in which the Peronist Party was the dominant party during the period under study and 
the Frente Para la Victoria emerged as a semi-autonomous, personalistic, faction 
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within the Peronist Party directly controlled by the President. In contrast, Uruguay is a 
typical case of party government (Rose 1969) in which political parties have a strong 
institutional presence and deep social roots.  Ruling parties never offer a blank check 
to the president who was obliged to permanently negotiate policy support with his 
own ministers (usually party factions’ leaders) and with the party’s parliamentary 
fractions.  
4) Within this context, agents developed their own strategies regarding the politics of 
patronage.   In the case of Argentina, Kirchnerismo exacerbated the top – down 
politicization of the public administration and the in-built personalistic bias of 
patronage, particularly during President Fernández de Kirchner’s second 
administration. Meyer-Sahling and Veen (2012) claim that problems of political control 
over the bureaucracy are more severe in political contexts characterized by regular 
wholesale alternations of ideological blocks of parties in government. Drawing from 
this claim, it could be argued that the hyper-politicized, rupturist nature of 
Kirchnerismo (Laclau 2006; Panizza 2015) brand of left-populism made the political 
control of the bureaucracy a high priority for the government, as expressed in the 
importance assigned to the appointment of political commissars. In contrast, in the 
Uruguayan case, the Frente Amplio as a moderate left-of- center political force largely 
maintained the traditional patterns of bargain and negotiations characteristics of the 
politics of appointment in Uruguay. Hence, the relatively larger number of political 
operators. 
5) Last but not least, our findings are relevant for understanding the relations between 
politics and the public administration.  The relatively large number of counsellors in 
both countries shows that both governments have important programmatic 
components and that securing policy responsiveness was a high priority17. We must 
stress, however, that the fact that appointees had technical expertise does not mean 
that they were the best-qualified persons for the jobs, particularly given that technical 
expertise was combined with personal or partisan trust. The abundance of commissars 
and political operators at medium level is also consistent with the administrations’ 
prioritization of policy responsiveness. Taken together, counsellors, commissars and 
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political operators almost monopolized policy design and implementation. While this 
secured policy responsiveness it raises the question of whether this institutional design 
is the best to secure the quality of public policies. But this is a matter for further 
research. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1. Evolution of permanent and non-permanent civil servants in the central 
administration in Uruguay (2005-2015) and Argentina (2004-2014) 
 
Sources: Llano and Iacoviello 2015; Observatorio de la Gestión Humana del Estado 
2016 (ONSC) 
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Figure 2 
- Experts perception of power of appointment (in %) 
 
Source: Survey results 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of patronage practices 
Motivations Roles 
Technical advice and expertise Counsellors (technopols and technocrats) 
Control of the public bureaucracy Commissars 
Political support for policy initiatives Political operators 
Electoral support Brokers and activists 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
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Table 2. Scope of patronage by level  
Level Scope Argentina  Uruguay  
High 
  
  
  
All-Almost all (80-100%) 89,3% 88,1% 
Many (50-79%) 10,7% 7,1% 
Quite (10-49%) 0% 4,8% 
A few (1-9%) 0% 0,0% 
Middle 
  
  
  
  
All-Almost all (80-100%) 28,6% 18,6% 
Many (50-79%) 35,7% 39,5% 
Quite (10-49%) 32,0% 18,6% 
A few (1-9%) 3,6% 14,0% 
None  0,0% 9,3% 
Low 
  
  
  
  
All-Almost all (80-100%) 7,1% 0% 
Many (50-79%) 14,3% 0% 
Quite (10-49%) 32,1% 2,3% 
A few (1-9%) 46,4% 34,9% 
None  0,0% 62,8% 
Source: Survey results 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 – Perception of the importance in motivations and roles for appointments by 
level of administrative hierarchy 
Level Argentina Importance  Uruguay Importance  
High Policy Expertise (Counsellors) 92,6% Policy expertise (Counsellors) 79,5% 
Control of Bureaucracy 
(Commissars) 63,0% 
Operate Politically (Political 
Operators 77,3% 
Medium Policy Expertise (Counsellors) 82,1% Policy Expertise (Counsellors) 69,4% 
Control of Bureaucracy 
(Commissars) 70,4% 
Control of Bureaucracy 
(Commissars) 61,1% 
Low Reward of brokers and activists  64,0% N/A - 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from survey results. 
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Table 4- Informants’ perceptions of motivations for appointments: Control and 
operate politically only (all levels) (%) 
 Control of Bureaucracy Operate Politically 
Argentina 67.27 42.86 
Uruguay 56.52 66.25 
 
Source: Surveyresults 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                          
1 The study of the different roles that patronage appointments play in central 
administrations, has  received more attention  in Europe (Connaughton 2015;  LSE 
Group 2012; Askim et al 2017; Kristinsson 2016) than in Latin America. European 
studies however, tend to concentrate in the narrow category of advisers, while the 
range of political appointees is much broader in Latina America´s politicized central 
pubic administrations.  
 
2 See https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/white-house-installs-political-
aides-at-cabinet-agencies-to-be-trumps-eyes-and-ears/2017/03/19. 
 
3 However, in Argentina mass clientelism is still common at provincial level (Scherlis 
2013: 29). 
 
4 Payne (2006) assigns Uruguayan presidents  an index of 0.39  and to Argentinean 
presidents and index of 0.47 in his 0 to 1 scale of presidential powers in which 0 is 
minimum power and 1 maximum power.  
 
5 The questionnaire provided a nominal list of the positions considered to be at the 
higher and medium levels of the administrative structure in each country.  
6 In Uruguay, to get round the legal disposition ministers promote functionaries of 
their personal or political trust within their ministries in an acting capacity, a widely 
used mechanism known as encargaturas.  The use of this mechanism was mentioned 
by several experts in the semi-structured section of the interviews. In  Argentina, in 
contrast, ministries tend to bring “their own people” from outside.  For corroborating 
evidence on Uruguay see  Filgueira, Heredia, Narbondo y Ramos (2002). For  Argentina, 
see Scherlis (2009) and Ferraro (2006) . 
7 In the table the cargos de confianza are codified as escalafón “Q”. 
 
8 “Uruguay Concursa”. Article 127, law 187191 of 27 December 2010 and Executive 
Decree dated 27 February 20111.  
https://www.uruguayconcursa.gub.uy/uruguayconcursa/uruguay_concursa_normativa
.htm. Accessed August 22, 2016. 
9 The fact that  the Kirchners’ exercised their power of appointment over the head of 
ministers was noted by several interviewees, particularly interviews No 12 and No 5. . 
For corroborating evidence see also Scherlis 2012, 59. 
39 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10 According to key informants, this was particularly evident in the ministry of the 
Economy and in the international trade and economic areas of the ministry of Foreign 
Relations, in which outsiders were appointed to positions traditionally held by 
professional staff (interviews No. 9 and 14). 
 
11 Interviews n..2, 3, 5 12, and 15,  . See also Scherlis (2012) 
 
12 Interview n. 9,to a politically-appointed  high civil servant at the Ministry of 
Economy. 
 
13 Interview n. 36 , to an appointee in charge of parliamentarian affairs at the Ministry 
of Agroindustry. “Banging the drums and eating sausages” [“tocar el bombo y comer 
choripán] are part of the popular culture of Peronist militants during public 
demonstrations. 
 
14  Interview n. 40 (Appendix), to a high political appointee at the Ministry of Economy. 
 
 
15 http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1869917-echaron-del-ministerio-de-agroindustria-a-
330-contratados 
 
 
16 Interview n. 34 (Appendix),  to a low rank civil servant at the Ministry of 
Agroindustry. 
 
 
17 In the case of Argentina this may be surprising for those who equate populism with 
clientelism and lack of ideological principles.  However, scholars of populism have 
shown that populism is different from clientelism and that populist parties can have 
strong politico-ideological components. 
 
  
 
